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OUR ELEVENTH CHIEF JUSTICE
By Allen Moore of the Denver Bar

HEN the news of the resignation of Chief Justice
William Howard Taft was announced to the public
on February 3, 1930, because of the serious illness
which later resulted in his death on March 8th, there came
with startling suddenness the news that President Hoover had
forwarded to the Senate, within four hours, the appointment
of Charles Evans Hughes to fill the vacancy thus created, but
since it met with country-wide acclamation no one thought
that it would meet with any particular objection in the Senate.
Seldom has a President acted upon so grave an appointment
with such speed. Thereupon, the appointment was referred
to the Judiciary Committee of the Senate and on February
10th that committee, through Senator Norris, its Chairman,
favorably reported the nomination and Senator Watson asked
for unanimous consent for its immediate consideration. Objections were made by Mr. Blease of South Carolina, and
thereupon followed on four successive days a fight on Mr.
Hughes' confirmation which gained great momentum and
attracted the attention of the whole country and has been
referred to variously, as "The Hughes Rebellion" and "The
Fight on the Supreme Court". Stainless in his personal reputation, distinguished for intellectual stature, with a fine record
for public service and a world-wide eminence as a statesman
and jurist, he was formidably challenged by Senator after
Senator as lacking the supreme qualification of judicial impartiality, as being, on the contrary, the outstanding representative of legal, economic and social reaction and as the foremost champion of property rights versus human rights and
as lacking in sensibility in accepting appointment to the Court
from which he had once seen fit to resign to become a candidate for the Presidency. The newspapers and periodicals
throughout the country became interested in the confirmation
fight and the echoes of it will be long in fading away.
Editorial comment in opposition to the Hughes appointment in the Senate called attention to the fact of the changing
character of the cases and controversies coming before the
Supreme Court for consideration. It was pointed out that
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whereas, aside from the major cases broadly interpretative of
the Constitution, the mass of the cases in its early history were
of minor importance, that by 1925 nearly half of the cases
concerned the control of economic enterprise, taxation, adjustment among the states, anti-trust cases and cases arising
under the commerce and due process clauses of the Constitution and under the 14th Amendment. In that year, 1925, an
Act was passed amending the Judicial Code and defining the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals and of the Supreme Court (Act of February 13, 1925) which relieved the
Supreme Court of ordinary common law and statutory cases
altogether and confined its province exclusively to relationships among the various governmental units of our federal
system and the relationship between the individual and the
State or National Government. Its function is now mainly
that of interpreting the Constitution. The Court is more and
more considering the meaning in particular controversies of
words such as "life," "liberty," "property," "regulate commerce ... among the several states," "privilege and immunities of citizens," "due process of law," and "equal protection of
the law." More and more the Supreme Court is becoming
a supreme policy-making body, a Curia Regis, as it were,
which differs from our other branches of government chiefly
in that its nine members hold their appointive positions for
life and are, therefore, not responsible directly to public
opinion.
Appointments to the Supreme Court, by reason of these
changes, are of increasing and transcendental importance and
the responsibility of the President is consequently all the more
grave.
It is urged by the more liberally minded that the Court
has shown a distinct bias in judgment on contentious social
and economic questions, a bias from which its own minority,
consisting largely of the same Justices in each case, viz.,
Holmes, Brandeis and Stone, has consistently dissented. The
two groups in the Supreme Court represent more fundamentally divergent social philosophies and attitudes of mind, conservative and liberal, than do the two major political parties
in Congress.
Through a line of decisions growing ever more severe,
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it is submitted, the majority of the Supreme Court has limited the ability of organized labor not merely to exert its influence, but to protect its very existence. In the Hitchman
Case, Hitchman Coal, etc., Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229,
it validated the "yellow dog contract" in a way which made
illegal the attempt to organize workers who have been forced,
as a condition of employment, to sign away their rights to
join a Union. In Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, it declared that a state could not pass a valid law prohibiting the
use of the injunction in labor disputes. It has, in the Duplex
Printing and the Bedford Stone Cutters cases, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Association, 274 U. S. 677,
denied the right of Unions to refuse to work on materials made
by non-union labor, if these materials were shipped in interstate commerce. It has denied the right of Congress to pass
child-labor laws, Hammer v. Dagenhart,247 U. S. 251, Bailey
v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, and of the states to
enforce mandatory minimum wage laws, Adkins v. Childrens
Hospital, 261 U. S. 525. At the same time it has enlarged
the scope of organized capital by applying the "rule of reason" in numerous anti-trust cases.
It is also urged by adherents of these views of the activities of the Court that it has denied the right of the public to
regulate public utilities by numerous specific rulings and has
continually enforced higher valuations; that it substituted its
own judgment for that of the expert Interstate Commerce
Commission in the O'Fallon Case, St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry.
Co. v. United States, 49 Sup. Ct. 385, and by its decision in
the case of United Railway and Electrical Company v. West,
et al, decided January 6, 1930, it has required the citizens of
Baltimore to pay tramway car fares sufficient to return 8 per
cent on a valuation based upon present cost of reproduction
and has included in the assets of the Company its franchise
to operate at a valuation of $5,000,000.00. All of these tendencies are cited as examples of the changing economics of
the Supreme Court.
If these tendencies are correctly interpreted there should
be a scrupulous examination of nominees to the Court and
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constant and unrelenting criticism of its decisions, rather than
considering it a sacrosanct retreat of abstract justice.
Below a brief account will be given of the debate which
took place in the Senate prior to Mr. Hughes confirmation
by that body on February 13, 1930, and his induction into
office February 24, 1930. As stated above, objection was made
to unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the
nomination when it was reported to the Senate, by the Judiciary Committee Chairman, Mr. Norris, on February 10th.
Mr. Norris then made a preliminary address concerning the
nomination although it was not before that body at that time.
He objected to Mr. Hughes' confirmation at that time principally on two grounds. First, that Mr. Hughes had resigned
from the Supreme Court to become a candidate for the Presidency of the United States; that he had left that high judicial
tribunal to enter the arena of partisan political debate and
after his ambitions in the political field had failed of realization he should not be reappointed to the Supreme Court and
particularly not be promoted to the position of Chief Justice.
Second, that we had reached a time in our history when the
power and influence of monopoly and organized wealth are
reaching into every governmental activity; that combinations
and mergers are of every-day occurrence, extending to every
line of business and commercial enterprise, there never having
been a time in the history of our country when combined
wealth has wielded as great an influence in the commercial
and political world as is being wielded at the present time;
that no man in public life so exemplifies the influence of powerful combinations in the political and financial world as does
Mr. Hughes; that almost invariably he has represented corporations of. almost untold wealth; that because of the supposed influence which he might exert upon the Supreme
Court, he was enabled to charge almost unlimited fees for
his services; that during his active practice, he has been associated with men of immense wealth and lived in an atmosphere
of luxury which can only come from immense fortunes and
great combinations and that therefore his viewpoint is clouded
and his decisions would be all in favor of big business. All of
these things, Mr. Norris thought, disqualified Mr. Hughes
to serve again upon the Supreme Court.
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On the following day, February I 1th, the Tariff debate
was interrupted to consider Mr. Hughes' nomination. Mr.
Borah thereupon led the attack. His line of argument against
Mr. Hughes' confirmation was that the Supreme Court is
more and more engaged in the consideration of public utility
valuation cases and rate cases; that in the Supreme Court
there are two distinct legal and economic view points, represented on the one side by the majority of the court, and on the
other, for the most part, by Justices Holmes, Brandeis and
Stone. Mr. Borah conceded that Mr. Hughes is a man of
high standing, one of the distinguished Americans of the day,
a man of wide reputation and acknowledged ability. Without
any reflection upon his integrity, he submitted that a Chief
Justice should not be placed upon the Supreme Court who
held the legal and economic views which Mr. Hughes holds,
with respect to property rights as opposed to personal rights.
He raised the point that Mr. Hughes had appeared in
the Newberry case, wherein Newberry, as candidate for the
Senate from the State of Michigan, was charged in an indictment with the criminal offense of having violated the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act, and was afterwards convicted. In that
case Mr. Hughes contended before the Supreme Court that
the Congress of the United States had no control, no power
of the original sources of activity which would result in the
selection of a Senator of the United States. His contention
was that the Federal Government was without power to protest against corruption on the part of those who were seeking
nomination at the hands of the people for a place in the Senate
of the United States. Mr. Borah called the attention of the
Senate to the fact that Mr. Hughes had served as attorney
for the American Petroleum Institute; that he had appeared
for the Interborough Company of New York in its effort to
collect increased fares; that he had appeared for the Meat
Packers in an attempt on their part to modify the decree
which had been entered against them; that he had appeared
for the American Jersey Pottery Company when it was
charged with a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, and
likewise for the American Malleable Castings Iron Company
charged with violating the same law. Mr. Blease of South
Carolina thereupon called the attention of the Senate to the
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fact that this is only the second time that a Justice of the
Supreme Court, who had resigned, was appointed Chief Justice of the United States, but that in the previous case of
Mr. Rutledge, after serving six months as such, his appointment was not confirmed.
Following this, Mr. Glass of Virginia, expressed his opposition to the confirmation of Mr. Hughes, first, upon his
lack of sensibility, that is, that a person who had once served
upon the Supreme Court and who had resigned to become a
candidate for a political office should not again accept the
appointment upon that court; and, second, because of the decision of the court in the famous Shreveport case, the opinion
in which was written by Mr. Hughes. Mr. Glass felt that
in the Shreveport decision every right that a state had possessed of control of intrastate traffic was literally stripped
from it, and since that decision, the Interstate Commerce
Commission has reached out time and time again and arrogated to itself necessary powers, in, one instance at least which
the Congress of the United States itself does not possess. In
the progress of the debate which followed, Mr. Wagner and
Mr. Copeland, Senators from New York and both Democrats,
came to Mr. Hughes defense, as did Mr. Gillett, Republican
of Massachusetts.
On February 12th and 13th, the debate on the confirmation of Mr. Hughes continued, led by Dill of Washington,
Brookhart of Iowa, Wheeler of Montana, La Follette of
Wisconsin, Nye of North Dakota, and again by Senator Norris
and others. The principal defense of Mr. Hughes was made
by Senator Glenn of Illinois who in a masterful characterization of Mr. Hughes as a lawyer, statesman and jurist, gave
a justification of his legal and economic views. Randell of
Louisiana and Shortridge of California also spoke in his defense. The opposition gained momentum as the fight progressed, but the proponents of Mr. Hughes had the necessary
votes and were not greatly worried, remaining confident
throughout the debate.
In addition to the points raised in opposition to Mr.
Hughes, previously mentioned, the broad question of the right
of the Supreme Court to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional was discussed as being a usurpation of power on the
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part of the Court; Mr. Hughes' contention in the case of
Federal Radio Commission, v. General Electric Company,

280 U. S. (preliminary print) 17A, that the great Radio Corporations of America had a vested right in perpetuity to
channels of communication through the air because of priority of appropriation, was viewed with alarm; the decision
of the Court in the Baltimore Tramway Case decided January
6, 1930, deciding that, "It is a settled rule of this Court that
the rate base is present value, and it would be wholly illogical
not to adopt this for depreciation," was cited as the most
extreme case in public utility valuation; and it was also urged
that Mr. Hughes being the oldest man ever to be appointed
to the Court was too old to accept the position.
The vote was taken late in the day on February 13th, resulting in 52 for confirmation and 26 against, with 18 not voting. Altogether, the debate was kept upon a fairly high
plane. Mr. Hughes' whole public life was submitted to the
closest scrutiny and criticism, but all conceded his high character, honesty and personal integrity. Yet as stated earlier in
this article, it'served to focus the attention of the Nation on
the attitude of some members of the Senate at least, toward the
Supreme Court and to cause much editorial comment of the
same general nature throughout the country.
In view of the interest aroused by the appointment of
Mr. Hughes to the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States it may be opportune once more
to review his life and character, his experience upon the Supreme Court, as Secretary of State and as a member of the
World Court.
It is stated that one day when Mr. Hughes was Secretary
of State a group of neophytes in the consular service filed into
his~outer office to get a word of inspiration from their Chief,
for the careers upon which they were about to embark. Mr.
Hughes told them, "The man who succeeds in his work in
any position where there are a great many burdens and demands is the man who can keep his head and intelligence, at
the same time giving the impression of a man adequate to the
exigency." This expression, "adequate to the exigency," very
aptly characterizes Mr. Hughes himself. He has ever been
"adequate to the exigency."
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What an amazing record we have in Mr. Hughes' career!
At the age of 44 we find him Governor of the great State of
New York, serving two terms; at the age of 48 he becomes
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, serving
with distinction for a period of six years; at 54, he resigns
from the Supreme Court to accept the Republican nomination for the Presidency, and after an ill-omened campaign
marching to its extraordinary conclusion on the night when
Mr. Hughes went to bed thinking himself President-elect, he
awakes the next morning to find himself a private citizen;
then follows a period of remunerative practice at the Bar,
after which, at the age of 59, he becomes Secretary of State
of the United States; then he serves at the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armaments, and at the Conference of the American Republics meeting at Havana last year;
then follows a period of private practice interspersed with
distinguished service and his duties as a Judge of the
Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and
now, .at the age of 68, the Eleventh Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States!
Charles Evans Hughes was born at Glen Falls, New
York, April 11, 1862, the son of Reverend David Charles and
Mary Catherine (Connelly) Hughes. His father was a Baptist minister, and the effects of the training which that implies
may readily be seen in the life of the distinguished son. He
entered Colgate university at the age of 14 and from 1876
to 1878 he attended there. He received his A.B. degree at
Brown University in 1881, and the A.M. degree in 1884, from
the same school. He went to New York in 1882 and began
the study of law, in the office of General Stewart L. Woodford
and at Columbia Law School, graduating in 1884 and being
admitted to the Bar the same year. He won the Prize Fellowship at Columbia Law School and was a Fellow there from
1884 to 1887.
After his admission to the Bar, he became a clerk, from
1884 to 1891, in the office of Chamberlain, Carter & -Hornblower of New York City, which was a notable corporation
firm. It is said that more than 100 distinguished lawyers have
served in that office. During 1891-93 he was Professor of Law
at Cornell University and special lecturer at New York Uni-
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versity Law School from 1893 to 1900. In 1888 he had married Antoinette Carter, the daughter of the senior member of
the firm. Four children were born of this marriage and it is
interesting to note that Charles Evans Hughes, Jr., became
Solicitor-General of the United States, resigning that office
upon the appointment of his father to the Supreme Court as
Chief Justice.
Mr. Hughes' career then expanded rapidly. For the next
ten years he applied himself diligently to a study of the history,
philosophy and practice of the law. He was a precise, methodically-minded man, extremely careful with the proprieties, never disposed to break the conventions, studying the law
and law systems as he found them. The firm was known as
Carter, Hughes & Cravath from 1887 to 1891 and Carter,
Hughes & Dwight from 1893 to 1904.
Until 1904, Mr. Hughes was perfecting himself in the
knowledge of corporation and general law, serving on many
important cases with such distinguished men as James
Coolidge Carter and Joseph Hodges Choate, but up to that
time he was comparatively unknown to the general public.
He first attracted popular notice in his capacity as counsel
for the Stevens Gas Commission, a legislative committee of
New York state which was appointed to investigate the price
of gas. The result of this committee's findings was the passage
of the law fixing the rate for gas in New York City. Afterwards this law was long contested, but its constitutionality
was finally upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In 190S, the great insurance scandal broke and the New
York Legislature appointed the Armstrong Insurance Commission, and Mr. Hughes, who was already becoming an
authority on insurance law, was chosen as the Committee's
Council. His admirable conduct of this case brought his
name before the general public and brought him rapidly to
the attention of the country, as he displayed uncommon skill
and proficiency in unearthing certain parts of the vast system
of insurance corruption through which the directors, brokers,
promoters, syndicates of magnates and retainers, members of
companies, lobbyists, and politicians enriched themselves at
the expense of the policyholders. Point after point he patiently brought out as to the involved and concealed circum-
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stances of the long continued loot and corruption. Reputations of many men long acclaimed for their respectability
were blasted, and others were ruined by these revelations. Mr.
Hughes' masterful handling of the great array of facts and
his splendid and fearless cross-examination of witnesses day
after day was the marvel of the profession. For at least two
months he subjected Thomas F. Ryan to the most merciless
cross-examination.
In 1905 he declined the Republican nomination for the
office of Mayor of New York City and in 1906 he served as
special assistant to the Attorney-General of the United States
in the coal investigation, but his handling of the insurance investigation had brought him before the public to the extent
that he could not resist accepting the nomination for Governor
of New York for the Republican party, and in 1906 was elected to the office, defeating his formidable opponent, William
Randolph Hearst, and serving from January 1, 1907, to October 6, 1910.
The administration of Governor Hughes was an unceasing fight for reform. In his first message to the Legislature
he recommended, among other things, a Public Service Commission law, extension of the Corrupt Practices Act, the Massachusetts ballot, direct primaries, laws for the protection of
women and children in factories, pure food and election laws.
The Public Service Commission Law was passed and the suggestions for labor laws were carried out but the remainder
of the program was defeated. The Direct Primary Bill was
defeated after a long struggle. The Governor carried the
matter to the people in several public addresses and called
an extraordinary session for a reconsideration of the bill but
it was again defeated. Finally, in 1913 under the administration of Governor Glynn, the Short Ballot Act was passed.
Race-track gambling was made unlawful in 1908. On the
whole, the administration of Governor Hughes was impartial
and progressive and won the approval of a majority of the
people of the State and his national reputation was greatly
enhanced.
In April, 1910, by a strange coincidence, William
Howard Taft, then President of the United States and now
Mr. Hughes' predecessor in the office of Chief Justice of the
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United States Supreme Court, appointed Mr. Hughes as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. The Senate acted
favorably on his appointment May 2, and on October 10, 1910,
he took office. For a period of almost six years he served with
distinction on the Supreme Bench-the nature and character
of his decisions will be discussed later in this article.
In 1908 he was the choice of the majority of the NewYork
delegation to the Republican National Convention but sufficient strength could not be obtained to secure his nomination.
Mr. Hughes was suggested as nominee at the convention of
the Republican Party in Chicago in 1912, but he refused to
permit his name to be considered. After a personal interview
with Justice Hughes at Lake Placid, New York, Rabbi
Stephen S. Wise was quoted in the New York Tribune of
June 21, 1912, in part as follows: "He would decline the
nomination if tendered him. Why? The Supreme Court
must not be dragged into politics. A Judge of the Supreme
Court should not be available, though he be nominally eligible
for elective office. The moment he assumes the judicial office
he ceases to be a partisan and knows, or should know, no partisan obligation. The moment he accepts a party nomination,
one or more things happen and happen explicably."
But three years later, having succeeded in staving off the
nomination to the Presidency in 1912, if it may be expressed
in that way, the urge came in 1916, to Justice Hughes to become a candidate for President, and in view of the situation
as it then existed, he accepted the nomination and conducted
a vigorous campaign. His defeat for that office by Woodrow
Wilson, who received 277 electoral votes to Mr. Hughes' 254,
is a matter of history which does not need to be expanded upon
here. It is interesting to note that in the Senate fight on
Mr. Hughes' confirmation, his resignation from the Supreme
Court to accept the nomination for the Presidency was one
of the principal things urged by his opponents, and likewise
the question as to the ethics of his practicing before the Supreme Court during the interim was used strongly against
him. Was it right for Mr. Hughes to practice before the
Supreme Court after his retirement as a member of it? Was
it right for him to return and plead the cases of corporation
clients before the body of men with whom he had become inti-
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mately associated during his membership upon the Court?
The example of Chief Justice Taft himself was cited and it
was stated that he had established such a standard and such
a rule and precedent in ethics, when, upon his retirement from
the Presidency, he announced that he would not practice his
profession before the Supreme Court, because he had appointed a majority of the members of that body. Perhaps the cases
are not at all alike, but still a doubtful point of ethics is raised
in the comparison of the conduct of the two men, and it was
so urged by Mr. Hughes' opponents during the confirmation
debate. From 1917 to 1921, he was a member of the law firm
of Hughes, Round, Schuman and Dwight in New York City
and an immense quantity of important litigation was handled
by that firm, the services of Mr. Hughes being greatly in demand in those cases requiring argument before the Supreme
Court.
From 1921 to 1925, he served as Secretary of State under
President Harding and President Coolidge. His predecessor
in office, Colby, liked to be clever, whereas Hughes liked to be
clear. He had a program, and he knew that with the Senate
still bitter over Wilson and the League of Nations, he could
not hope to put this program through without public support.
This support he obtained through the newspapers. He talked
to the country daily, taking the people into his confidence as
far as he could. The editor of "Mirrors of Washington" said
of him, "He makes foreign relations hold front pages with
the Stillman Divorce Case." Secretary Hughes seemed to be
a wizard in the handling of the press during the time of the
Washington Arms Conference. As Secretary of State he set
his goal at the largest practical measure of international cooperation. He preached the doctrine of enlightened selfinterest. The interests of the United States after the war demanded that she abandon her policy of aloofness. His admirable-handling of the International Conference on the Limitations of Armaments, as its chairman, his persistent advocacy
of our entry into the World Court, his subsequent service on
that Court and his work in the interest of Pan-American
friendship were notable contributions to the cause of peace
and good will, and will place him as one of our greatest Secretaries of State. He emerged from the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in 1921 a world figure.
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He represented the United States as Commissioner Plenipotentiary at the Sixth International Conference of American
States at the City of Havana in February, 1928. Later in collaboration with Secretary Kellogg, he served at the memorable
Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration at Washington,
which resulted in the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration and the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, both of which were signed by the Plenipotentiaries
of 20 American nations. His competent labors, his scholarship, diplomacy and statesmanship were of the highest and
rarest kind and did much to aid in the highly successful outcome of these conferences. The result of the negotiations of
Mr. Hughes and Mr. Kellogg may be ultimately known in
history as the Pax-Americana. His admirable conduct of the
office during so critical a period in our history will unquestionably cause him to be ranked as one of the greatest among
our many distinguished Secretaries of State.
On May 1, 1929, he sailed from New York as Judge of
the Permanent Court of International Justice, commonly referred to as the World Court. Tributes were paid to him by
many leading Americans in such terms as "No worthier representative could be chosen," "A great lawyer, a great statesman,
a strong personality is called to a great opportunity," "The
beginning of a new and enlarged opportunity for distinguished
service" and "No better selection could have been made."
Prior to this, on January 25, 1929, the Bronx County Bar
Association had tendered Mr. Hughes a banquet at which the
Hon. William D. Guthrie, reviewed in most eloquent terms,
the life and service of the new appointee. That address is
to be found in the "American Bar Association Journal" for
May, 1929.
Now, with his appointment as Chief Justice of the United
States, an office which is second only to that of the Presidency,
Mr. Hughes enters a new period of service. It is a long way
from the days of the insurance investigation when he was
spoken of as "an example of the good man in politics", from
his other years as a teacher of Greek and Latin in the Delaware Academy at Delhi, N. Y., and a plodding professor of
law at Cornell and New York Universities, and the busy days
of his active practice at the bar. Mr. Hughes' career has
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been dramatic in the extreme. For more than 25 years he
has been in the spotlight, always "adequate to the exigency."
As a lawyer, he represents quite a contrast with the type
of advocate represented by William Pinkney and Rufus
Choate or the constitutional lawyer of the type of Webster,
Clay and Calhoun. He is the modern type of business lawyer,
clear, cool, logical, mathematical, capable of digesting immense quantities of business details, analyzing business policies and presenting them clearly to the courts. If Elihu Root
represents one of the first of the modern corporation type of
lawyers, capable of acting as Counsellor to business executives
in great combinations and merger movements, Mr. Hughes
is of the same type and perhaps even a more advanced type;
yet, withal, a man of broad viewpoint, with more of a flair
for public service, and of undertaking searching investigations
and involved matters of litigation which bring to the forefront his amazing analytical ability. Both in the interval
between his resignation from the Supreme Court and his taking office as Secretary of State and from the time he left that
position until this present appointment, the character of his
practice has been largely that of representing large business,
insurance and public utility corporations. From 1925 until
his appointment to the Supreme Court, he appeared in 54
cases before that body. The list of these cases was released for
publication by Senator Norris on February 8th, and presents
a formidable array of important cases decided or to be decided by the Supreme Court.
If we should like to know what manner of Chief Justice
he will make, it would be well to examine his previous record
on the Court. When Mr. Hughes went on the Supreme Court
in 1910 he was without any previous judicial experience. During the six years he served on that "more than Amphictyonic
Council," as William Pinkney long ago designated the Supreme Court in his argument in the Neriede Case, he wrote
150 opinions, including a half dozen dissenting opinions. Altogether he dissented 23 times. The task of the Supreme
Court during these latter years has been rather to clarify principles and to apply them to intricate problems of modern life
than to interpret the Constitution along broad lines. For the
most part, the Supreme Court in the last generation has been
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developing the due process clause as found in the 14th and
15th amendments to the Constitution and the Commerce
Clause, since, for the most part, the other clauses of the Constitution had previously been interpreted. We think of Marshall as having the most decisive weight in the interpretation
of the constitution, yet we are astonished by the fact that his
great constitutional opinions number only 42. It is quite
probable that the decisions rendered by Mr. Hughes during
the six years on the Supreme Court were of far more importance than those of Marshall. In 16 Columbia Law Review,
565 (1916), Arthur M. Allen gives an illuminating discussion of "The Opinions of Mr. Justice Hughes."
It is there pointed out that Justice Hughes' miscellaneous
legal opinions cover questions of admiralty, the rights of Indians, domestic relations, the jurisdiction of the courts, questions of practice and evidence, trusts and restraints of trade,
construction of statutes, trade-marks, copyrights, the customs
laws, riparian rights, patents, wills, bankruptcy, Pure Food
laws, the relation of master and servant and a variety of other
subjects. In many of these decisions most important property
and personal rights were involved.
It is also pointed out there that his constitutional opinions
cover a wide range comprising the interpretation of the 13th
Amendment in Bailey v. Alabama (1911) 219 U. S. 219; questions relating to the validity of state statutes fixing the liability
of the railroads as employers as in Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad v. McGuire (1911) 219 U. S. 549; the question of the right of the courts to compel the production of
documents in criminal cases in Wilson v. United States ('1911)
221 U. S. 361; questions involving the Interstate Commerce
Commission in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. The Interstate
Commerce Commission, (1911) 221 U. S. 612; the validity
of an eight hour law for women in Miller v. Wilson (1915)
236 U. S. 373; and double jeopardy in the case of Graham v.
West Virginia (1912) 224 U. S. 616.
Justice Hughes' greatest contributions to American constitutional law were made in a number of important cases
involving the relative powers of the states and the Federal
Government over intrastate commerce, and the questions relating to the rights of the states to regulate rates imposed
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by public service corporations. The most important of these
cases are the Minnesota Rate Cases (1913) 320 U. S. 352;
Houston & Texas Railroadv. United States (1914) 234 U. S.
342 and Northern Pacific Railway v. North Dakota (1915)
236 U. S. 585, which virtually took away from the state commissions the right to regulate intrastate rates.
The opinions of Justice Hughes failed to disclose any
expressions of his own personal economic views or any feeling
that the constitution itself needs to be sacredly guarded
against the encroachments of modern civilization. They show
a close concentration upon the facts of the particular case, an
entire suppression of personality, the lack of rhetorical devices of any kind and in their way are models of judicial expression. None of them shows anything but a purely impersonal and impartial discussion of the principles involved in
the instant case, yet in the Senate the fear was repeatedly expressed that his personal bias, his personal economic and
social views and his bias toward his clients would influence
his interpretation of the Constitution. It clearly appears from
his opinions that on the great questions affecting labor he was
at no time reactionary, but that he viewed such problems with
a broad and sane sympathy and it must be remembered that
he represented a labor union in the Coronado Case, after leaving the Court. Upon the trust question he has been in favor
of the "rule of reason", while in public utility valuation cases
he has been the leading advocate of the doctrine of the fixing
of rates on present values, that is, cost of reproduction, and
thus in line with the views of the majority of the Court, but
necessarily opposed to those of Justice Brandeis and Justice
Holmes. His decisions in these two fields will be watched
with the greatest interest.
His scholarly attainments are best represented by his discussion of the foundations, methods and achievements of the
United States Supreme Court published in 1928 as the
"Supreme Court of the United States," a series of lectures
which he delivered at Columbia University in 1927. This
book discusses the foundations of the Supreme Court, gives a
description of the Court at work, its organization and methods,
and its achievements in cementing the union. A very interesting phase of the book is his discussion of liberty, property and
social justice as interpreted by the Supreme Court. It is most
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interesting to have an interpretation of the work of the Court
by one who has served on the Court itself. His other published works are "Conditions of Progress in Democratic Government" (Yale Lectures) 1909 and "The Pathway of Peace
and Other Addresses," 1925.

Mr. Hughes is a fellow of Brown University, a Trustee
of the University of Chicago, and during the war, he served
as chairman of the Tariff Appeals Board for New York City.
In 1918 he was appointed by President Wilson as special
assistant to the Attorney-General in charge of the aircraft
inquiry.
He was President of the New York State Bar Association for 1917-18; President of the Legal Aid Society of New
York for 1917-19; President of the New York County Lawyers' Association 1919-20; and has always been active in
American Bar Association work and President of that Association in 1924, at the time of the pilgrimage of the American
lawyers to London. There he had the honor of delivering
an oration in Westminster Hall, the great hall of William
Rufus. His address made a profound impression on all who
heard it. Mr. Hughes spoke for the legal profession of the
United States before the dignitaries and leaders of the British,
Canadian and American Bars. As our representative and
spokesman, his eloquence rose to the occasion. He was thereafter elected and acclaimed an Honorary Bencher of the
Middle Temple. Following this he spoke on our behalf at
the Palace of Justice in Paris, to the French Bar, in lofty and
inspiring language.
From the foregoing it would appear that, notwithstanding the criticism and comment brought about by the appointment of Mr. Hughes to the office of Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, his distinguished career
symbolizes the highest and best standards and traditions of
the American Bar; that his preparedness, industry and competency, indeed his genius, have been demonstrated in the varied private and public services of his life; that his eminent
qualifications for the position, his splendid talents and his
brilliant successes in the past, all augur well that he will fill
with honor the lofty position held in the past by Marshall
and Taney, by Waite and Fuller and White and by his immediate predecessor, the late William Howard Taft.

